Dissertation

Picture"I have measured out my life in coffee spoons" - T.S. Elliot
Dissertation Title: "Non-Parasitic Warlords and Geographical Distance"
Dissertation Committee: 
  • Dr. Dimitrios Diamantaras, Associate Professor (Economics), Temple University; email: dimitrios.diamantaras@temple.edu
  • Dr. Dai Zusai, Assistant Professor (Economics), Temple University; email: zusai@temple.edu
  • Dr. Moritz Ritter, Assistant Professor (Economics), Temple University; email: moritz.ritter@temple.edu
  • Dr. Edward Rosenthal, Professor (Marketing and Supply Chain Management), Temple University; email: edward.rosenthal@temple.edu 

Publications

  • Hionis, Jerry. "Non-Parasitic Warlords and Geographical Distance". Economics of Peace and Security Journal. Vol. 10, No.1 (forthcoming 2015).

Works In Progress


1. "Symmetric and Asymmetric Rates of Seizure within a Warlord Conflict" 
  • In many situations of civil war and insurgency, the economic decision making on the part of all players in dependent upon what each is willing to gain and lose from participating in the conflict. This paper analyzes the effect geographical distance has on the conflict investment level of two warring parties when an asymmetric rate of seizure is dependent upon the distance one is from the point of conflict. 
2. "Voter Registration as a Form of Conflict"
  • Each election cycle brings with it an organized effort to increase voter registration, especially amongst the youth. While all major political parties     support such efforts, and even invest their own "war-chest" funds toward it, there is also a competition to obtain the voters' votes. I aim to model such scenarios as a conflict game where each player invests capital to increase the public pool of potential voters while fighting the remaining players for votes themselves. 
3. "The Case for a Centralized Zakat Distribution Mechanism"
  • Zakat, the mandatory charity or poor-rate on Muslim holdings, is of significant interest to the Muslim community within the US. In this paper, we present a model of zakat distribution using a centralized mechanism across multiple areas. This centralized mechanism aims to increase the aggregate amount of funds allocated to those deemed most needy over the less needy. Comparing the centralized method and the a more autonomous method, we show that the aggregate value of zakat distribution is greatest when the centralized method is used.
4. "The Role of Economic Theory in Frank Herbert's Dune"
Conferences & Invited Talks:
1. 2013 Southern Economic Association Conference (Nov. 23-25); Tampa, FL
  • Presented "Non-Parasitic Warlords and Geographical Distance".
2. Economics Department at Saint Joseph's University (Oct. 8, 2013)
  • Presented "Introduction to the Field of Islamic Economics with a Focus on the Microeconomic Foundations"
3. 2014 Eastern Economic Association Conference (March 6-9); Boston, MA
  • Presented "Symmetric and Asymmetric Rates of Seizure within a Warlord Conflict".

4. 2014 Southern economic Association Conference (Nov. 22-24); Atlanta, GA
  • Presenting "Symmetric and Asymmetric Rates of Seizure within a Warlord Conflict (UPDATED)"
  • Presenting "The Case for a Centralized Zakat Distribution Mechanism"